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The Supreme Court Defines the Right to Trial by Jury

The Supreme Court Allows
Smaller Juries
Randolph N. Jonakait
Having declared trial by jury a fundamental right in Duncan v. Louisiana, the Supreme Court began to take a closer
look at some of the particular judicial rules that differed
from state to state, such as jury size. In Williams v. Florida,
the. Court found that the traditional twelve-person jury was
not in fact a legal necessity; a six-person jury, but no smaller,
would pass constitutional muster. As Randolph N. Jonakait,
a professor of law at New York Law School, explains, this
finding overturned a previous ruling, in Thompson v. Utah,
holding that citizens were entitled to a common law jury of
twelve members, at least in federal court. Drawing on a
number of studies, as well as his own experience as a lawyer
for the New York City Legal Aid Society, Jonakait disputes
the Court's finding that size is not especially significant to
jury fairness. For Jonakait, twelve-person juries are fairer,
more likely to contain minority members, and less inconsistent than smaller juries.

n 1968 Duncan v. Louisiana held that the right to a jury
trial in a criminal case is fundamental and that the same
right applies in both state and federal prosecutions. The federal courts had but a single model for a jury trial. A jury consisted of twelve people who had to reach unanimity in order
to render a verdict, as the Supreme Court had said two year
earlier. The right applied to trials of any federal crime that
was not "petty," which was defined as a crime carrying a possible penalty of more than six months.
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The states, in contrast, had diverse models for juries. Some
states employed juries smaller than twelve; some did not require juries to be unanimous in their decisions; and although
all states guaranteed jury trials, they varied concerning the
kinds of crimes to which this right applied. Indeed, Louisiana
law at the time of Duncan illustrated all these complexities.
Jury trials were guaranteed, but only for crimes that carried
sentences of death or hard labor. If not, the trial went to a
judge without a jury. If the crime permitted, but did not require, a sentence of hard labor, the accused was entitled to a
five-person jury with a unanimous verdict. If the crime required a punishment of hard labor, a twelve-person jury was
required, but only nine of the jurors had to agree to reach a
verdict. If the crime was punishable by death, the jury was
twelve and the verdict had to be unanimous.
After Duncan, the Supreme Court began to consider whether
the different state forms of jury trials were constitutional. The
process began in 1970 when the Court in Williams v. Florida
held that a jury of six passed constitutional muster. In doing
so the Court abandoned its precedent of Thompson v. Utah,
'
set at the end of the nineteenth century.

Thompson v. Utah
A Mr. Thompson was charged in the Utah territory with calfrustling. He was tried and convicted in the territorial courts
by a jury of twelve, as federal law dictated, but his motion
for a new trial was granted. This second trial was held in the
state court because by then Utah had gained statehood. As
the Utah constitution permitted, this jury had only eight people. In 1898 the case made its way to the Supreme Court,
which first noted that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury
trial applied in the territorial courts and that, whatever the
normal powers of the state, any trial for a crime committed
before statehood had to provide a jury consistent with the
federal constitution. The Court stated that the federal jury
trial right required a jury constituted as it was in the common law of this country and England. This, Thompson concluded, was a jury of twelve acting unanimously. "The wise
men who framed the constitution of the United States and
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the people who approved it were of the opinion that life and
liberty, when involved in criminal prosecutions, would not be
adequately secured except through the unanimous verdict of
twelve jurors. It was not for the state, in respect of a crime
committed within its limits while it was a territory, to dispense with that guaranty simply because its people had
reached the conclusion that the truth could be as well ascertained, and the liberty of an accused be as well guarded, by
eight as well as by twelve jurors in a criminal case."

Williams v. Florida
Seventy years later the Supreme Court again considered the
issue of jury size. This Court found that Thompson's basic
approach was wrong. Williams u. Florida agreed that the
common law required juries of twelve, but the Court went on
to state that "there is absolutely no indication in 'the intent
of the Framers' of an explicit decision to equate the constitutional and common-law characteristics of the jury." Instead,
the Court concluded that no one could now know precisely
what the framers meant by a jury trial.
Rather than searching history for the constitutionally required number of jurors, Williams concluded that a jury's
characteristics should be defined by the function that the
framers envisioned for juries: the prevention of governmental oppression. Williams continued, "Given this purpose, the
essential feature of a jury obviously lies in the interposition
between the accused and his accuser of the commonsense
judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation and shared responsibility that results from the
group's determination of guilt or innocence." Differently sized
bodies could serve these functions, but "the number should
probably be large enough to promote group deliberation, free
from outside attempts at intimidation, and to provide a fair
possibility for obtaining a representative cross-section of the
community."
The Court, citing but a few experiments and mostly using
its own instincts, concluded that juries of six would little affect how well juries performed. The Court intuited that the
change in community representation between juries of six and
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twelve "seems likely to be negligible," and while juries of six
might be less likely to hang than juries of twelve, this "seems
unlikely to inure perceptibly to the advantage of either side.
... And, certainly the reliability of the jury as a factfinder
hardly seems likely to be a function of its size." The Court concluded that the twelve-person jury was merely "a historical
accident." A jury of six, the Court held, is constitutional.

Studies of Jury Size
Williams engendered a storm of controversy by concluding that
halving the historical jury would not affect group deliberations
and community participation. Scholars quickly produced a
flurry of studies about how size affects jury performance.
Three years after Williams, however, that research did little
to alter the Supreme Court's view of smaller juries. In 1973
Colgrove u. Battin held that six-person civil juries did not violate the Seventh Amendment's right to juries in civil cases.
Consigning its discussion of the studies to a footnote, the
Court noted that since 1970, "much has been written about
the six-member jury, but nothing that persuades us to depart
from the conclusion reached in Williams."
In 1978, however, while reviewing Claude Ballew's misdemeanor obscenity conviction by an Atlanta jury of five, the
Court took more note of the scholarship regarding jury numbers. The Court now stressed that social science studies
showed smaller juries had a negative effect on deliberations.
"The smaller the group, the less likely are members to make
crit.ical contributions necessary for the solution of a given
problem ....
Memory is important for accurate jury determinations. As juries decrease in size, ... they are less likely to
have members who remember each of the important pieces
of evidence or argument. Furthermore, the smaller the
group, the less likely it is to overcome the biases of its members to obtain an accurate result. When individual and group
decision-making were compared, it was seen that groups performed better because prejudices of individuals were frequently counterbalanced, and objectivity resulted."
These studies also showed that accuracy decreased and
inconsistency increased with smaller panels. Moreover, because
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juries generally hang because one or two jurors hold out
against the remainder favoring conviction, the decrease in
hung juries resulting from a smaller jury size disproportionately harms criminal defendants by increasing the conviction rate. Finally, the Court noted, smaller juries will not
represent the community as well as larger ones. "If a minor-
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ity viewpoint is shared by 10% of the community, 28.2% of
12-member juries may be expected to have no minority representation, but 53.1 % of 6-member juries would have none."
Although these data suggested that the assumptions underlying the acceptance of six-person juries were wrong, the
Court did not overturn its earlier decision. Instead, without
"pretend[ing] to discern a clear line between six members
and five," the Court reaffirmed that six-person juries were
constitutional but held that juries of less than six were not.
Research on how size affects jury performance has continued. The studies consistently show that larger juries are more
likely to contain minority members, recall more of the evidence, spend more time deliberating, and bring more informational resources to those deliberations than are six-person
juries. Just as individuals render more variable decisions
than groups, juries of six produce more variability than do juries of twelve. In civil cases, studies generally agree, smaller
juries show an increased variability in damages, with a higher
average award ....

The Supreme Court's Faulty Intuition
Juries can be, and in some places are, smaller than six. In
concluding that halving the traditional jury would not significantly affect how juries perform, the Supreme Court cited
only a few empirical studies without probing their validity.
Instead, it relied almost entirely on its own instincts. Competent studies, however, show these judicial assumptions to
be wrong. In other words, the justices did not know what they
were talking about.
This may be surprising, but it should not be. Few Supreme
Court judges have had much contact with juries. The bar, like
almost any human institution, has its own hierarchy. As a
general rule, the less a lawyer deals with "common people,"
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the more prestigious the position she holds. The lawyer involved with mergers and acquisitions stands on a higher rung
than one dealing with personal injuries or crimes. Supreme
Court justices do not represent a cross-section of the bar. They
generally come from the bar's elite, and this gentry seldom
has much experience with juries. Because the Supreme
Court's intuitions about juries do not come from any depth of
experience, they should not automatically be trusted.
There is, of course, a broader point here. Supreme Court
Justices .are educated and thoughtful. If this group's intuitions about juries should be viewed skeptically, surely suspicion is also in order for the views of many others about the
jury system, no matter how smart, prestigious, or knowledgeable, when those opinions are based only on intuitions, assertions, and anecdotes and not on extensive experience or
serious study.

